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ABSTRACT 
 
Efficient and Inefficient Welfare States 
 
This paper shows that cross country differences in the generosity and the quality of the 
welfare state are associated with differences in the trustworthiness of their citizens. We show 
that generous, transparent and efficient welfare states in Scandinavian countries are based 
on the civicness of their citizens. In contrast, the generosity but low transparency of the 
Continental European welfare states survive thanks to the support of a large share of uncivic 
individuals who consider that it can be justifiable to misbehave with taxes and social benefits. 
We also explain why countries with an intermediate degree of trustworthiness of their citizens 
and of transparency of the government, like Anglo-Saxon countries, have small welfare 
states. Overall, this paper provides a rationale for the observed persistence of both efficient 
and inefficient welfare states, as a function of the civicness of the citizens. 
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1 Introduction
Why are welfare states so generous and transparent in Scandinavian countries? Why are
Continental European welfare states as large as in Scandinavian countries, but perceived
as much less transparent and e¢ cient by their citizens? Why do most Anglo-Saxon
countries have relatively small welfare states? This paper shows that part of the answer
to these questions can be explained by the cross country heterogeneity in trustworthiness
that shapes the demand for redistribution and the e¢ ciency of the welfare states.
In a cross section of countries, we rst show the existence of a non monotonous rela-
tionship between trust and the generosity of the welfare states in OECD countries. Figure
1 shows the relationship between the share of social expenditure in GDP and the country
level of trust in 2000.1 The relation is rst increasing for low trust countries, reaching
a local maximum for countries with a relatively low level of trust like France, Belgium,
Germany and Italy. The relation then becomes decreasing, reaching a local minimum
for the Anglo-Saxon countries and Japan. Finally, the relationship starts increasing again
with the country level of trust, reaching a peak for Scandinavian countries. Figure 2 shows
a similar relationship between the transparency of the welfare state, measured with the
corruption perception index,2 and the size of the welfare state.
These two gures show that countries with low trust and low transparency of the
government can have welfare states as large as countries with high trust and high trans-
parency of the government. Moreover, countries with intermediate levels of trust and
transparency of the government have relatively small welfare states. We show that this
non monotonous relationship exists for various measures of the scope of the welfare state.
This relationship also holds when one looks at the conditional levels of trust and trans-
parency of the government, controlling for a large set of socio economic variables such as
education, income, occupation, religiosity and political orientation.
1Social expenditure is dened as total social public expenditure in the OECD Social Expenditure
Database. The variable trust is measured as the answer to the following question of the World Values
Survey:Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very
careful in dealing with people?. The answer can be either Most people can be trusted, which corresponds
to the value 1, orCant be too careful, corresponding to the value 0.
2The index comes from Transparency International. This index can take on values from zero for the
most corrupt governments to 1 for the least corrupt. The original index which takes on values from zero
to 10 has been rescaled to ease comparisons with the measure of generalized trust.
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Figure 1: Trust and public social expenditure in 2000. Source: World Values Survey and
OECD social expenditure DataBase.
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Figure 2: Corruption Perception Index and public social expenditure in 2000. Source:
Tranparency International and OECD social expenditure DataBase.
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We then rationalize the (non monotonous) relationship between trust and the scope of
the welfare state. We begin by providing a simple political economy model which analyzes
the relation between trust and the scope of the welfare state. The model comprises civic (or
trustworthy) and uncivic individuals. Civic individuals cheat neither on taxes nor on social
benets and they behave properly when they serve as o¢ cials. Uncivic individuals cheat
on taxes and on social benets if this is in their own interest. They do not behave properly
when they serve as o¢ cials. The model predicts that everybody wants more social benets
when he expects to be surrounded by more civic individuals, because there is less fraud
on taxes and benets and o¢ cials are more e¢ cient. However, uncivic individuals want
more redistribution than civic individuals because they escape from taxes, but benet
from public transfers. This implies that a rise in the share of civic individuals has two
opposite e¤ects on the demand for the welfare state. On one hand, everybody wants
more redistribution, expecting to be surrounded by more civic individuals. On the other
hand, the demand for redistribution is reduced because there are fewer uncivic individuals
asking for a high level of transfers. These two opposite e¤ects induce a non monotonic
relationship between the share of trustworthy individuals and the size of the welfare
state. It is possible to get a large, but ine¢ cient, welfare state in a society populated by
numerous uncivic individuals who cheat on social benets, escape from taxes and do not
behave properly when they serve as o¢ cials. Conversely, the welfare state can be both
large and e¢ cient only if the share of civic individuals is su¢ ciently great. The model thus
explains why big welfare states can be supported in both low and high trust countries,
but with very contrasting perceptions of their degree of transparency as shown in gures
1 and 2.
We test the predictions of the model using individual international social surveys.
The most immediate prediction is that the support for the welfare state is related to
generalized trust and to trust toward government institutions. Using the European Social
Survey (ESS) and the World Values Survey (WVS), we nd that individuals who think
that they are surrounded by more civic people exhibit stronger support for the welfare
state. Trust in the parliament, in politicians, in the legal system and in the e¢ ciency and
the equity of the tax authorities is also positively associated with support for the welfare
state. We nd that uncivic individuals, who declare that it can be justiable to claim
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government benets to which one is not entitled, to avoid a fare on public transport, or
to throw away litter in a public place, support more generous social programs than civic
individuals who declare that such behaviors are never justiable. Finally, we show that
the perceived quality of services provided by the welfare state is higher in countries where
there is more generalized trust and more condence in government institutions. Strikingly,
it turns out that increases in social expenditure do not improve the perceived quality of
public education, public health, public pensions and unemployment insurance if they are
not accompanied by improvements in the trustworthiness of citizens and of governments.
In order to highlight the thrust of our explanation of the scope of the welfare state, we
compare the e¤ect of trustworthiness with the alternative traditional explanations of the
support for the welfare state. The economic literature has so far put forward three main
factors for explaining the cross country heterogeneity in the generosity of welfare states.
The rst one is based on traditional economic determinants. In a seminal paper, Alesina
et al. (2001) show that economic characteristics such as the distribution and variance of
income fall short of explaining the heterogeneity in the demand for redistribution. We
elaborate further by showing that trust has a much more substantial inuence on the
demand for redistribution than basic economic variables such as individual income. The
second explanation proposed by the literature points in the direction of beliefs di¤erent
from trust. In particular, Alesina et al. (2001), Alesina and Angeletos (2008), Alesina
and Sapienza (2010), Luttens and Valfort (2011) have shown that the demand for redis-
tribution is linked to beliefs in fairness, beliefs in merit and e¤ort (as opposed to luck)
to explain individual success, or parochial altruism. We show that none of those beliefs
has an e¤ect as substantial as trust on the individual demand for redistribution. A third
trend of this literature explains systematic di¤erences in the demand for redistribution
by cultural preferences. In particular, Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) nd that, af-
ter German reunication, East Germans are more in favor of redistribution than West
Germans, even after controlling for economic incentives. Luttmer and Singhal (2010)
document the e¤ect of culture on the demand for income redistribution by estimating
the preferences of immigrants in European countries. Using the ESS database, they show
that the preferences of immigrants correlate strongly with the demand for redistribution
in their country of origin. We show in this paper that it is mainly the inherited cultural
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beliefs that matter for rst generation immigrants. However, support for the welfare state
of second generation immigrants is no more correlated to the support for the welfare state
in their country of origin, but is strongly correlated with generalized trust and the trust
in institutions prevailing in their residence country. This result, which is consistent with
those of Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) and Luttmer and Singal (2010),3 suggests
that the support for the welfare state is driven by beliefs about the behavior of compatriots
that progressively adapt to the local context and by inherited cultural preferences. After
about one generation, beliefs of immigrants about the behavior of compatriots and about
the transparency of the welfare state are in line with those of natives of their country of
residency.
Our contribution is related to at least three literatures. The rst literature is that
of political scientists who stress the existence of a positive and monotonous relationship
between trust and the welfare state. For instance, Hetherington (1998, 2004) argues that
declining political trust has played the central role in the demise of progressive public
policy in the United States over the last several decades. Uslaner and Rothstein (2005)
and Rothstein et al. (2010) argue that the scope of the welfare state in OECD countries is
limited by trust toward other peopleand toward government institutions. According to
these authors, the survival of large welfare states in the Scandinavian countries is explained
by high social trust and high quality of government. The narrative of this idea can be
traced back to at least Adam Smith, who stressed in The Wealth of Nations, in those
corrupted governments where there is at least a general suspicion of much unnecessary
expense, and great misapplication of the public revenue, the laws which guard it are little
respected.(Smith, 1976, p. 898).4 This explanation ts well with the specic group of
very high-trust countries. But it cannot account for the existence of fairly large welfare
states in the OECD countries characterized by relatively low levels of trust, like France
3It is also consistent with those of Nannestad et al. (2008), Dinesen and Hooghe (2010) and Dinesen
(2011) who nd that both parental transmission of trust as well as perceptions of institutional fairness
matter for the level of trust of young immigrants, but the impact of perceptions of institutional fairness
is stronger.
4In the same book Smith noticed that taxes were easy to levy in Hamburg because in places where
the people have entire condence in their magistrates, are convinced of the necessity of the tax for the
support of the state, and believe that it will be faithfully applied to that purpose, such conscientious
and voluntary payment may sometimes be expected (Smith, 1976, p. 850). See Evinsky (2005) for a
thorough discussion.
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or Italy. Our paper is distinguished from this research in political science in at least
two central ways. First, we document and provide a rationale for the existence of a non
monotonous relationship between trust and the welfare state. Besides, we explain why
large welfare states might be supported in both high-trust and low-trust countries, but
are transparent and e¢ cient in the former group of countries only. Second, we propose
a theory rationalizing the relationship between trust and the welfare state, and provide
microevidence to identify the specic relationship running from trust to the demand for
the welfare state.
The second literature is the economics of redistribution. The seminal economic expla-
nations of the support for redistribution are based on the distribution of incomes before
taxes and transfers (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004) and on the beliefs on income mobility
(Piketty, 1995, Benabou and Ok, 2001, Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005). More recent be-
havioral explanations have put to the fore the role of fairness (Corneo and Gruner, 2002,
Alesina and Angeletos, 2005, Luttens and Valfort, 2011) and reciprocal altruism (Fong,
2001, Fong et al. 2006, ), of inherited preference ingrained in past historical experience
(Corneo and Gruner, 2002, Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007, Luttmer and Singhal,
2010, Alesina and Giuliano, 2010), of ethnic fragmentation and group loyalty (Luttmer
2001, Alesina and Glaeser, 2004) and of the desire to act in accordance with public values
(Corneo and Gruner, 2002). A third literature looks at the role of political institutions
and of the electoral system (Alesina et al., 2001, Persson and Tabellini, 2002) in shap-
ing the welfare states. Our paper contributes to this literature by identifying trust as a
new determinant. Besides, we show that trust plays a substantial role in explaining the
demand for redistribution once we control for the main factors identied in the economic
literature so far.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 documents the cross country correlation
between various measures of trust and the generosity of the welfare states. Section 3
presents the model to rationalize this relationship through a mechanism running from
trustworthiness to the support for the welfare state. Section 4 tests the predictions of the
model on individual data. Section 5 compares the role of trustworthiness with alternative
beliefs and cultural preferences. Section 6 concludes.
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2 Basic Facts
This section documents the non monotonous relationship between trust and the size of
the welfare state. Figures 1 and 2 in the introduction use the country average level of
trust in others and in institutions. In this section, we rst check the robustness of these
relationships by using the conditional average level of trust, controlling for individual char-
acteristics. We regress the various measures of trust on gender, age, education, income,
occupation, family situation, religiosity and political orientation5, and country xed ef-
fects taking Norway as the reference country. Table 13 (reported in Appendix) shows the
probit estimates for generalized level of trust, measured by this question from the World
Values Survey: Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or
that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?. The answer is equal to 1 for
Most people can be trusted, and 0 for Cant be too careful. Estimated coe¢ cients
show that the country xed e¤ects are the main factors driving the variation in trust
across individuals living in di¤erent countries.6 The country xed e¤ects that measure
the conditional average level of generalized trust are thus almost perfectly correlated with
the simple country average measure (country xed e¤ects explain 87 percent of the cross
country variance of trust). We also look at the conditional average level of condence in
institutions as a measure for the quality of institutions. From the World Values Survey,
we use the questions on the level of condence in The Parliament, The Civil services
and The Justice system. For each question, the answer ranges from 1 for A great
deal , 2 for quite a lot , 3 for not very much to 4 for none at all . We reorder
the answers so that a higher scores denote a higher level of condence in the institution.
We measure the index condence in institutions as the rst principal component of the
three questions. Table 14 (in Appendix) shows the OLS estimates of the index condence
in institutions on individual characteristics and country xed e¤ects. The country xed
5Education is the highest educational level attained, classied in 8 levels. Income is dened on a
scale that comprises 10 levels. Occupation comprises the following categories: employed, unemployed,
in education, retired and others. Family situation can be married, separated/divorced, widowed, never
married. Religiosity provides information about the frequency of attendance at religious service, going
from never to more than once a week, classied in 8 levels of frequency. Political orientation corresponds
to the answer to the following question: In political matters, people talk of the left and the right. How
would you place your views on this scale (going from one for left to 10 for right), generally speaking?.
6Portugal is missing because of the lack of information on income and education in the WVS for this
country.
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e¤ects account once again for most of the cross country heterogeneity in the condence
in institutions (68 percent).
Figures 3 and 4 show the relationship between those conditional average measures of
trust in others and trust in institutions, and the share of social spending in GDP. We nd
the same non monotonous relationship pattern as the one found in Figures 1 and 2 with
the simple country average level of trust.
We then document that this non monotonous relationship holds for alternative mea-
sures of the generosity of the welfare state. We rst use the overall generosity score
computed by Scruggs (2004). The generosity index summarizes the generosity of three
social insurance programs: sickness, unemployment and pension. Calculations are based
on an average productive worker. For each program and each country, a score is assigned
following the programs characteristics (replacement rate, qualication conditions, dura-
tion, etc.) and coverage. The nal index is computed as the sum of the three scores and
reects increasing generosity of the system. Figures 5 and 6 represent the relationship
between the overall generosity score in 2000 and the conditional average measures of trust
in others and condence in institutions. According to gure 5, countries with relatively
low levels of trust, like Belgium and France, as well as countries with high levels of trust,
like Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Norway, have generous welfare states. Countries with
intermediate levels of trust have less generous welfare states. Figure 6 shows the same
relationship pattern between the conditional level of condence in institutions and the
Scruggs index of welfare generosity. The size of the welfare state is minimum for coun-
tries with intermediate levels of condence in institutions, like the United States and the
United Kingdom.
Figures 7 to 11 show the association between tax wedges for single individuals or
couples and the conditional average level of trust in others and in institutions. These
gures conrm the non monotonous relation between the scope of the welfare state and
the various indicators of trust.
These basic facts raise two main issues. First, how can we explain the non monotonous
relationship between the size of the welfare state and the level of trust? Second, how can
large welfare states survive despite the heterogeneity in their degree of transparency and
e¢ ciency?
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Figure 3: Trust and public social expenditure in 2000. Source: World Values Survey
(authorscalculation) and OECD social expenditure DataBase.
The next sections rationalize both theoretically and empirically these ndings by iden-
tifying the relationship running from trust to the welfare state that transits through the
demand for redistribution as a function of trust and civicness.
3 The model
This section presents a simple model which highlights the relations between generalized
trust, trust toward government institutions and the scope of the welfare state.
3.1 The setup
There is a continuum of individuals of measure one and a government which levies taxes
and provides social benets.
Every individual is either civic or uncivic. The share of civic individuals is denoted
by : Civic individuals pay taxes and only claim benets to which they are entilted.
Uncivic individuals are purely opportunistic: they cheat on taxes and benets when this
is worthwhile. All individuals have the same preferences over consumption, which are
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Figure 4: Condence in institutions and public social expenditure in 2000. Source: World
Values Survey (authorscalculation) and OECD social expenditure DataBase.
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Figure 5: Trust and overall generosity score in 2000. Source: World Values Survey
(authorscalculation) and Welfare State Entitlements Dataset.
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Figure 6: Condence in institutions and overall generosity score in 2000. Source: World
Values Survey (authorscalculation) and Welfare State Entitlements Dataset.
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Figure 7: Trust and average tax wedge for single individuals in 2000. Source: World
Values Survey (authorscalculation) and OECD Taxing Wages Statistics.
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Figure 8: Trust and average tax wedge for couples in 2000. Source: World Values Survey
(authorscalculation) and OECD Taxing Wages Statistics.
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Figure 9: Condence in institutions and average tax wedge for couples in 2000. Source:
World Values Survey (authorscalculation) and OECD Taxing Wages Statistics.
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Figure 10: Condence in institutions and average tax wedge for couples in 2000. Source:
World Values Survey (authorscalculation) and OECD Taxing Wages Statistics.
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Figure 11: Condence in institutions and average tax wedge for couples in 2000. Source:
World Values Survey (authors calculation) and OECD Taxing Wages Statistics.
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represented, for the sake of simplicity, by the logarithmic utility function ln(c); where c
stands for consumption.
Every individual produces y > 0 units of the consumption good with probability
 2 (0; 1) and zero with probability 1   : Productive individuals, who produce y > 0;
must pay a tax, denoted by t; to nance benets provided to those who produce nothing.
Productive individuals can hide their production with probability p: Civic individuals
always declare their true level of production. Thus, they pay the required tax if they
are productive and they claim benets only if they are unproductive. Uncivic individuals
able to hide their production never pay taxes and always claim benets whatever their
level of production.
Taxes are levied by o¢ cials. Every individual is working during the day and is an
o¢ cial at night. To represent the fact that uncivic o¢ cials do not do their duty, we
assume that only the share  2 [0; 1] of taxes is transformed into social benets. The
complementary share 1    is a deadweight loss.7 This assumption allows us to account
in a simple way for the fact that the share of uncivic o¢ cials is more likely to be higher
when there are more uncivic individuals in the society as a whole. And, accordingly, that
governments are less e¢ cient in countries where there are more uncivic individuals.
Let us describe the timing of events. First, individuals are born either civic or uncivic.
Second, individuals vote on benets and taxes. Third, a share  of individuals produce y
and a share 1   produce nothing. Then, benets and taxes are paid.
3.2 The support for the welfare state
Let us rst look at the support for the welfare state of civic and uncivic individuals.
All individuals choose the tax and benets that maximize their expected utility subject
to the budget constraint of the government. The tax receipt of the government is made
of the tax paid by the  productive civic individuals and of the p(1   ) productive
uncivic individuals whose production cannot be hidden. Since taxes managed by uncivic
7Alternatively, it could be assumed that o¢ cials capture taxes. This leads to the same qualitative
results (see the discussion below). It could also be assumed that the probability to hide production
decreases with the share of civic o¢ cials to the extent that civic o¢ cials are more conscientious. This
does not change the result that the relation between trust and the scope of the welfare state is not
monotonous. Moreover, this assumption is questionable to the extent that uncivic o¢ cials who capture
taxes may be as motivated as (and even more motivated than) civic o¢ cials to levy taxes.
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individuals are lost, the total amount of resources available to provide social benets is
equal to t [+ p(1  )] : Benets are provided to the (1 ) unproductive individuals
and to the (1  p)(1 ) productive uncivic individuals who can claim benets because
their production can be hidden. Accordingly, the budget constraint is
t [+ p(1  )] = [(1  ) + (1  p)(1  )] b: (1)
 Civic individuals expect to get the income y   t if they are productive and to get
benets b otherwise. They choose taxes and benets which maximize
 ln(y   t) + (1  ) ln(b)
subject to the budget constraint (1). The solution satises the budget constraint
and the rst order condition
b
y   t =
 [+ p(1  )]
1 + 
(1 )(1  p)(1  )
 civic (2)
This equation shows that the demand for social insurance of civic individuals, mea-
sured by the ratio of benets of unproductive individuals over the net income of
productive individuals, increases with the share of civic individuals. At the limit,
there is full insurance, i.e. b = y   t, when everyone is civic ( = 1). Otherwise,
there is partial insurance. When  = 0; there is no social insurance.
 Uncivic individuals choose taxes and benets which maximize
 [p ln(y   t) + (1  p) ln(y + b)] + (1  ) ln(b)
subject to the budget constraint (1). The solution satises the budget constraint
and
b
y   t = civic +
b
y + b
1  p
p
 [+ p(1  )]
1   [+ p(1  )] : (3)
It turns out that uncivic individuals want more redistribution than civic individuals
because the ratio b=(y  t) dened by equation (3) is larger than that dened by equation
(2). Uncivic individuals want more redistribution for two reasons. First, they benet from
public transfers more frequently than civic individuals since they claim benets when their
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production can be hidden. Second, they do not bear all the burden of taxation since they
escape from taxes when this is possible.8
It also appears that the support for the welfare state of uncivic individuals increases
when the share of civic individuals is larger.
At this stage, the predictions of the model are that uncivic individuals want more
redistribution than civic individuals and that all individuals want more redistribution
when they expect to be surrounded by more civic individuals and by a more e¢ cient
welfare state.
3.3 The outcome of the vote
Individuals vote on the level of taxes and benets compatible with the budget constraint.
Since preferences are single peaked, we can assume that the outcome of the vote is dened
by the median voter. Thus, taxes are determined by uncivic individuals if the share of
civic individuals is smaller than 1=2 and by civic individuals otherwise. The outcome is
represented on gure 12. It shows that the relation between the share of civic individuals
and the level of social insurance is not monotonic because the support for the welfare
state of uncivic individuals is greater than that of civic individuals. It is possible to have
large welfare states supported by a majority of uncivic individuals who cheat on taxes
and benets. This can explain why countries with a large share of uncivic individuals and
weakly e¢ cient government, like Italy, France and Belgium, can have welfare states as
large as civic countries like the Scandinavian countries.
Moreover, when the median voter is uncivic, the size of the welfare state is ine¢ ciently
high to the extent that maximization of any convex combination of the utilities of civic
and uncivic individuals yields a lower tax level than that decided by the median voter.
4 Empirical results
In this section, we seek to establish the main predictions of the model at the individ-
ual level. First, there is a positive relation between generalized trust and the perceived
civicness of the fellow citizens on one hand, and the support for the welfare state on
8Uncivic individuals would have a third reason to prefer higher taxes and benets than civic individuals
if uncivic individuals captured taxes when they are o¢ cials.
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0                                                              ½ 1 a
b/(y-t)
1
Figure 12: The relation between the share of civic individuals and the scope of the welfare
state.
the other hand. Second, trust in government institutions is positively associated to the
support for the welfare state. Third, less civic individuals want more redistribution. We
seek to identify through these three predictions the causal impact of trust on the welfare
state working through popular demand. Finally, we test the fourth prediction accord-
ing to which welfare states are less e¢ cient in countries where there is low condence in
government institutions.
4.1 Data
Most of the analysis is based on the fourth round of the European Social Survey which
provides a specic module on attitudes towards the welfare state and was conducted in
2008 and 2009. We use 24 countries9 for which the variables we are interested in are
available. This survey provides information about a large set of socioeconomic character-
istics and beliefs. Our measure of the support for the welfare state relies on the answer
to the following question: Many social benets and services are paid for by taxes. If the
9Belgium, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Israel,
Latvia, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom.
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government had to choose between increasing taxes and spending more on social benets
and services, or decreasing taxes and spending less on social benets and services, which
should they do?. Answers range from 0, Government should decrease taxes a lot and
spend much less on social benets and services, to 10, Government should increase taxes
a lot and spend much more on social benets and services. This scale clearly reects an
increasing support for the welfare state. Its formulation has the advantage of stressing
both the costs and the benets of the welfare state. This question is also much more
explicit regarding the demand for the welfare state than the ones related to the role of
government in reducing inequalities, traditionally used in the literature (see Alesina and
Giuliano, 2010). It should also be noticed that this question implicitly makes reference to
the government of the country where the interview takes place. It is preceded by a series
of questions about social benets and tax authorities which make explicit reference to the
country where people are interviewed.
4.2 Generalized trust and perceived behavior of compatriots
In table 1, we investigate the relationship between trust and the support for the welfare
state. The dependent variable is the ESS question on the support for the welfare state.
In columns 1 and 2, the explanatory variable of interest is the level of trust measured
by the question: Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or
that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?. The variable ranges from 0 for
You cant be too carefulto 10 for Most people can be trusted. We include controls
for age, gender, education, income of the household, family status, employment status,
political orientation and religiosity. Column 1 shows the results of the estimation without
country xed e¤ects while country xed e¤ects are included in column 2. The coe¢ cient
associated with trust is positive and signicant at the 1% level in both columns. The size
of the coe¢ cient of trust is economically signicant. In column 2, the fact of claiming that
Most people can be trustedrather than You cant be too carefulis associated with an
increase in the support for the welfare state which is ve times larger than the demand for
redistribution of the unemployed relative to employees. The coe¢ cient associated with
political orientation shows that right wing individuals express less support for the welfare
state. The coe¢ cients of trust and of political orientation have the same magnitude. This
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means that a one point move on the 0-10 distrust-trust scale is associated with the same
change in the support for the welfare state as a one point move on the 0-10 left-right
scale. It is worth noting that the coe¢ cient associated with the income of the household
is negative, but not signicantly di¤erent from zero, suggesting that the support for the
welfare state is not signicantly inuenced by income. Education is positively correlated
with the support for the welfare state, but the coe¢ cient associated with education is ve
times smaller than the coe¢ cient associated with trust.
The ESS also provides a large set of detailed questions about the trustworthiness and
the perceived civicness of compatriots. In columns 3 and 4 of table 1 we use the general
question on fairness of others: Do you think that most people would try to take advantage
of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair?. The variable is equal to 0 if
the respondent answered Most people would try to take advantage of meand 10 if it is
answeredMost people would try to be fair. Columns 3 and 4 of table 1 show that we get
similar results as before with this measure of trust. In columns 5 and 6 of table 1, we also
look at a broad question on civicness: Would you say that most of the time people try
to be helpful or that they are mostly looking out for themselves?. The variable is equal
to 0 if the respondent answered People mostly look out for themselvesand 10 if it is
answeredPeople mostly try to be helpful. Table 1 shows that the perceived civicness of
compatriots is positively associated with the demand for redistribution. The coe¢ cient
is statistically signicant at 1%.
We then turn to more specic questions on the behavior of compatriots toward social
benets. The rst question reads : Many people manage to obtain benets and services to
which they are not entitled. The variable is equal to 1 if the respondent agrees strongly,
2 if he agrees, 3 if he neither agrees nor disagrees, 4 if he disagrees and 5 if he disagrees
strongly. We include the same individual controls as before. Columns 1 and 2 of table 2
shows the results without country xed e¤ect and with country xed e¤ect respectively.
The belief in the way compatriots (mis)use social benets is steadily associated with
the individual demand for redistribution. The e¤ect is substantial: the fact of agreeing
strongly rather that disagreeing strongly with the claim Many people manage to obtain
benets and services to which they are not entitledis associated with a reduction in the
demand for redistribution which is twice as large as the gap between the demand for
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redistribution of unemployed workers and employees (column 2). The second question
reads Most unemployed people do not really try to nd a job.The variable takes values
ranging from 1 if the respondent agrees strongly to 5 if he disagrees strongly. Columns 3
and 4 of Table 2 show that the demand for redistribution is statistically signicant and
positively associated with the fact of believing that unemployed workers make e¤orts to
nd a job. The third question reads Employees often pretend they are sick in order to
stay at home. The answer still ranges from 1 for strongly agree to 5 for strongly disagree.
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 2 show the same highly signicant relation between the beliefs
in the e¤orts of employees and the demand for redistribution.
All these results show that there is a strong positive relation between perceived civic-
ness of compatriots and the demand for redistribution. The support for the welfare state
turns out to be particularly sensitive to beliefs in free riding on public transfers of com-
patriots.
4.3 Trust in government institutions
The model predicts that the second driving force of the demand for a generous welfare
state is not just the level of trust in compatriots, but also the level of trust in government
institutions. We exploit two sets of questions related to those beliefs.
First, respondents are asked how much do you personally trust each of the institutions
I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete
trust. We look at trust toward the parliament, politicians, and the legal system. Table 3
shows that there is a strong positive relation between trust toward these institutions and
the demand for redistribution. The size of the coe¢ cient is economically very signicant.
The order of magnitude is the same as for generalized trust.
Second, there are two specic questions about tax authorities. One question is about
the e¢ ciency of tax authorities: How e¢ cient do you think the tax authorities are at
things like handling queries on time, avoiding mistakes and preventing fraud?. The
answer ranges from 0 if the respondent considers that tax authorities are extremely in-
e¢ cient in doing their job to 10 if tax authorities are considered as extremely e¢ cient.
The other question is about the equity of tax authorities: Tell me whether you think
the tax authorities in your country give special advantages to certain people or deal with
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everyone equally?. The answer ranges from 0 if the respondent considers that tax au-
thorities give special advantages to certain people to 10 if he believes that tax authorities
deal with everyone equally. Table 4 shows that both beliefs in the e¢ ciency and beliefs
in the equity of tax authorities are strongly positively associated with the demand for
redistribution.
4.4 Civic spirit
Our model predicts that uncivic individuals want more redistribution than civic indi-
viduals because they escape from taxes and they abuse social benets. The European
Social Survey does not comprise the relevant information needed to analyze the relation
between civic spirit and the demand for redistribution. Accordingly, we use the World
Values Survey, which allows us to measure civicness using the answer to the following
question: Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can
always be justied, never be justied, or something in between, using this card.We use
answers to following statements: Claiming government benets to which you are not
entitled; Avoiding a fare on public transport; Cheating on taxes when you have a
chance; Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties; Throwing away litter
in a public place; Buying stolen goods. The answers range from 1 for never justi-
ableto 10 for always justiable. As shown by gure 13 in the appendix, a very large
share of respondents answer never justiable to those questions. Other answers are
chosen by small and equally distributed shares of respondents. We thus distinguish two
main types of individuals: those who claim that the behaviors described in the questions
are never justiableand those who say that they can be justiable. Hence, for each
question, we create a variable measuring civic spirit which is equal to 1 if the answer is
never justiable and 0 for all other answers. The WVS provides information about
the support for the welfare state with a question close to that of the ESS: Id like you
to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale?
1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree com-
pletely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you
can choose any number in between. Incomes should be made more equal versus We need
larger income di¤erences as incentives. We reverse the scale of the answers so that a
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higher score indicates a higher support for the welfare state. We check that the WVS
yields the same positive relation between trust and the demand for redistribution as that
obtained from the ESS. In the WVS, trust is measured with a question similar to that of
the ESS:Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you
need to be very careful in dealing with people?. The answer can take either the value 1 for
Most people can be trustedor the value 0 for Cant be too careful.10 Column 1 of table
5 shows a positive and statistically signicant relationship between generalized trust and
the support for the welfare state as measured by the question of the WVS. The relation
between civic spirit and the support for the welfare state is displayed in columns 2 to 7
of table 5. The explanatory variable of interest is civic spirit. All specications include
country xed e¤ects and time xed e¤ects for the year of interview. For all statements,
the estimated coe¢ cient of civic spirit is negative and statistically signicant. This means
that more civic individuals want less redistribution, as predicted by the model. In terms
of magnitude, the estimated e¤ect of being civic on the support for the welfare state is
as large (or even larger in some specications) as the e¤ect of gender or as the e¤ect of
being unemployed instead of employed.
4.5 E¢ ciency of welfare states
The model predicts that welfare states are less e¢ cient in countries where there is less
generalized trust, less trust toward government institutions and less transparency of the
government. We measure the e¢ ciency of the welfare state using information about the
perceived quality of services provided by the welfare state. We use the following four
questions of the ESS: 1) What do you think overall about the standard of living of pen-
sioners?; 2) What do you think overall about the standard of living of unemployed?;
3)What you think overall about the state of education ?; 4)What you think overall
about the state of health services ?. For all these questions, the answer ranges from 0 if
the respondent chooses extremely badto 10 if the respondent chooses extremely good.
In table 6, we regress the answer to each of these questions on the average country levels
of generalized trust, of trust toward government institutions and on the transparency of
10In the ESS, the respondents choose an answer on a scale going from 0 for You cant be too careful
to 10 forMost people can be trusted.
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the government measured by the corruption perception index. Other explanatory variables
include the share of social expenditure in GDP and individual characteristics (not reported
here).
As shown by estimated coe¢ cients presented in table 6, generalized trust, trust in
the legal system, trust in the fairness of tax authorities and the transparency of the gov-
ernment are positively and signicantly correlated with the perceived quality of services
provided by the welfare state. By contrast, the share of total social expenditure in GDP
is not correlated with the perceived quality of services provided by welfare states. These
results mean that welfare states are more e¢ cient in countries with more trustworthy cit-
izens and more trustworthy government. More strikingly, they also indicate that increases
in public social expenditure do not improve the perceived quality of public education,
public health, public pensions and unemployment insurance if they are not accompanied
by improvements in trust or in the quality of government institutions.
5 Robustness checks
The previous section has shown that the support for the welfare state is strongly associated
with generalized trust and trust toward government institutions. We have shown that
these beliefs are substantial determinants of the support for the welfare state. We now
investigate the robustness of this analysis to alternative explanations.
5.1 Culture or trust?
First, we explore whether the support for the welfare state is shaped by culture or by
the actual institutional and social environment. Using the ESS database, Luttmer and
Singhal (2010) show that the demand of immigrants for redistribution is correlated with
the demand for distribution in their country of origin. Demand for redistribution would
thus be ingrained in cultural preferences. To sort out the respective role of the current
context, including the behavior of compatriots and the e¢ ciency of institutions, and
culture, we focus on the support for the welfare state of immigrants in the ESS. The
ESS comprises information about the country of residence, the country of birth, and the
country of birth of the mother and of the father. This information allows us to identify rst
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generation and second generation immigrants. We observe individuals from 28 di¤erent
countries. They live in 24 countries.
We regress the support of immigrants for the welfare state on the average level of
beliefs (trust toward others and trust toward institutions) in their country of residence
and on the average demand for redistribution in their country of origin.11 These two
variables allow us to evaluate the relative weight of the beliefs in their country of origin
and of the beliefs in their country of residence for explaining the individual demand for
redistribution. The inuence of the average demand for redistribution in their country of
origin reects the inuence of culture. The inuence of beliefs in their country of residence
reects the inuence of the actual environment where immigrants are currently living.
Table 7 shows the results when we focus on the role of generalized trust in the country
of residence. We nd that for rst generation immigrants, the demand for redistribution in
the country of origin is correlated with the support for the welfare state in the country of
residence. Trust in the country of residence is weakly correlated with the support for the
welfare state of immigrants. It is thus mainly the inherited cultural beliefs that matters.
Yet when we turn to the demand of second generation immigrants for redistribution, only
the local level of trust is statistically signicant. This result suggests that the support
for the welfare state is driven by beliefs that adapt to the local context and by cultural
preferences whose inuence disappears for second generation immigrants.
Table 8 reports the estimates when we focus on the local level of trust in institutions.
We nd similar results as before: the support for the welfare state of rst generation
immigrants is statistically signicantly correlated to the demand for redistribution in their
country of origin but not to trust in institutions in their country of residence. However, for
second generation immigrants, the correlation with the support for redistribution in the
country of origin vanishes and the correlation with trust in institutions in their country
of residence becomes signicant.
All in all, tables 7 and 8 suggest that individual support for the welfare state is shaped
by inherited culture and by the current environment. Moreover, they suggest that the
inuence of culture disappears after one generation.
11For second generation immigrants, the average demand for redistribution in the country of origin is
equal to the average demand for redistribution in the countries of birth of parents. If parents are born
in di¤erent countries, we take the average of the two countries.
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Table 9 conrms this nding by showing that the individual demand for redistribution
is in line with the local average demand for redistribution and with the average demand
for redistribution in the country of origin for rst generation immigrants. The rst column
of table 9 presents the estimation of a regression where the left-hand side variable is the
support for the welfare state of rst generation immigrants measured by the answer to the
question of the ESS, and where the right hand side comprises individual controls for age,
education and employment status. The right hand side also comprises the average support
for the welfare state, GDP per capita in 2000 and the share of social expenditure in GDP
in 2000 in the country of origin and in the country of residence. It appears that the
support for the welfare state of rst generation immigrants is correlated with the average
support for the welfare state in the country of origin at 10 percent level of condence
and in the country of residence at 1 percent level of condence. Moreover, the coe¢ cient
associated with the country of residence is more than twice as large as the coe¢ cient
associated with the country of origin. Column 2 presents the result of the estimation of
the same equation for second generation immigrants. Their support for the welfare state
is not correlated with the support for the welfare state prevailing in their country of origin,
but it is strongly correlated with that of their country of residence. In Columns 3 and 4,
we run the same regressions for rst and second generation immigrants respectively, where
the right hand side comprises, in addition to individual controls and the average country
of origin support for the welfare state, country of residence xed e¤ects instead of average
support for welfare state, GDP per capita and the share of social expenditure in GDP
in the country of residence. The coe¢ cient associated with the support for the welfare
state in the country of origin is not di¤erent from zero for either generation. In Columns
5 and 6, the right hand side comprises, in addition to individual controls and the average
country of residence support for the welfare state, country of origin xed e¤ects instead
of average support for welfare state, GDP per capita and the share of social expenditure
in GDP in the country of origin. The coe¢ cient associated with the average support for
the welfare state in the country of residence is strongly signicant.
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5.2 Trust or alternative beliefs?
Beliefs in the determinants of success and in social mobility have been shown to be
strong determinants of the demand for redistribution. In this sub-section, we investigate
whether the correlation between trust and the demand for redistribution persists when
those alternative beliefs are taken into account.
Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) have shown that beliefs in the determinants of success
in life are strongly correlated with the demand for redistribution. More precisely, the
belief that success is more likely to be determined by luck than by e¤ort induces a higher
demand for redistribution. On the contrary, people who think that they can climb the
social ladder by their own hard work are more likely to demand less redistribution by
the state. As the ESS does not include a question giving information about such beliefs,
we use the WVS, as in table 5 where we investigated the relationship between civicness
and the demand for redistribution. In table 10, the dependent variable is the individual
support for the welfare state, measured with the answer to the question about the desired
degree of income inequality. We measure the feeling that success is determined by hard
work rather than by chance using the following question from the WVS: Hard work brings
success. Possible answers are on a scale between 1 and 10, 1 means In the long run, hard
work usually brings a better life, whereas 10 means Hard work does not generally bring
success - its more a matter of luck and connections. In table 10, the two explanatory
variables of interest are trust and the belief in chance as a determinant of success, which we
call luck . Both specications include individual control variables. In addition, country
xed e¤ects are included in column 2, but not in column 1. The estimated coe¢ cient of
luck is not statistically signicant. In contrast, the estimated coe¢ cients of trust are very
close to those presented in table 5. This result has two implications: rst, it means that
the e¤ect of trust on the support for the welfare state is robust when we control for the
individual beliefs in the determinants of success; second, it means that the e¤ect of trust
is much larger than the e¤ect of luck, which is found to be non-signicant.
In table 11, we replicate the same exercise using luck and our di¤erent measures of
civicness as main explanatory variables. The di¤erent waves of the WVS including ques-
tion about luck and civicness do not perfectly overlap. Hence, the number of observations
is strongly reduced in some columns of table 11. The results of these regressions suggest
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two comments. First, once civicness is controlled for, luck has no e¤ect on the support for
the welfare state. Indeed, luck is found to be non-signicant in all specications. Second,
despite the smaller size of the sample, the correlation between civicness and the support
for the welfare state still holds when controlling for luck and for three out of our six
measures of civicness.
Using British data, Clark and DAngelo (2010) have shown that climbing the social
ladder with respect to parents is also an indicator of social mobility associated with po-
litical preferences that reects weaker support for the welfare state. Such mobility can be
observed using the di¤erence between the education of the respondent and the education
of his parents. This measure of social mobility is likely to reect realized and expected
increasing (or decreasing) social mobility. In line with this reasoning, if an individual has
a higher level of education than his parents, then his demand for redistribution should
be weaker. In table 12, we use the ESS and show that the correlation between trust and
the support for the welfare state is still statistically signicant when mobility is taken
into account. In order to capture social mobility, we construct dummy variables for each
di¤erence between the level of education of the respondent and that of his parents. This
specication takes into account all the possible upward or downward mobilities. We mea-
sure education using a 7 item scale which ranges from not completed primary education
to second stage of tertiary . The interaction between respondents education and par-
entseducation gives a set of 49 dummy variables. We replicate the same exercise using
the education of the father and the education of the mother. In table 12, we alterna-
tively include the two sets of social mobility measures in regressions of the support for
the welfare state on the di¤erent measures of trust used in table 10. All specications
include individual control variables and country xed e¤ects. The estimated coe¢ cients
of the di¤erent measures of trust are similar when using either education of the mother
or education of the father. Moreover, the estimated coe¢ cients are virtually identical to
those estimated in table 10 using country xed e¤ects. These results mean that the e¤ect
of trust on the support for the welfare state persists when controlling for social mobility.
27
6 Conclusion
This paper shows that the scope of welfare states is associated with trust in a non trivial
way. Large and ine¢ cient wefare states survive thanks to the support of a majority of
uncivic individuals. The creation of large and e¢ cient welfare states needs a large majority
of civic citizens.
These ndings suggest that the large welfare states of Continental European coun-
tries are ine¢ ciently large. Our results show that increases in public expenditure do not
improve the perceived quality of public education, public health, public pensions and un-
employment insurance if they are not accompanied by improvements in the reliability of
government institutions. However, improvements in the reliability of government institu-
tions and in the trustworthiness of citizens are associated with better quality of services
provided by the welfare state. This suggests that the priority of political reforms in Con-
tinental European countries should be to improve pro-social behavior of citizens and the
transparency of government institutions rather than merely increasing social expenditure.
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Dependent variab le: support for the welfare state
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Most p eop le can b e trusted 0.111*** 0.0708***
(0.0254) (0 .0126)
Most p eop le try to b e fa ir 0 .0931*** 0.0518***
(0.0287) (0 .0126)
Most p eop le try to b e help fu l 0 .0808*** 0.0465***
(0.0242) (0 .0123)
Age 0.0108*** 0.0101*** 0.0111*** 0.0101*** 0.0119*** 0.0104***
(0.00243) (0 .00137) (0 .00218) (0 .00134) (0 .00231) (0 .00137)
Male -0 .0454 -0 .0494 -0 .0280 -0 .0386 -0 .0329 -0.0411
(0.0395) (0 .0369) (0 .0391) (0 .0381) (0 .0391) (0 .0380)
Education 0.00483 0.0146** 0.00933 0.0171** 0.0122 0.0184**
(0.0104) (0 .00674) (0 .0106) (0 .00698) (0 .0105) (0 .00708)
Incom e -0.00428 0.00246 -0 .00165 0.00351 0.00270 0.00556
(0.0115) (0 .00977) (0 .0125) (0 .00962) (0 .0119) (0 .00907)
Relig iosity 0.00511 0.0145** 0.00665 0.0154** 0.00477 0.0149**
(0.0150) (0 .00595) (0 .0145) (0 .00590) (0 .0147) (0 .00580)
Politica l orientation -0 .109*** -0 .117*** -0 .109*** -0 .118*** -0 .108*** -0 .117***
(0.0269) (0 .0288) (0 .0265) (0 .0287) (0 .0269) (0 .0289)
Married Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference
Separated / D ivorced -0 .00937 -0 .0282 -0 .00477 -0 .0308 -0 .00464 -0 .0305
(0.0609) (0 .0504) (0 .0615) (0 .0493) (0 .0594) (0 .0483)
W idowed -0.141** -0 .102** -0 .153** -0 .107** -0 .157** -0 .106**
(0.0636) (0 .0436) (0 .0631) (0 .0424) (0 .0657) (0 .0438)
Never married 0.114** 0.0945*** 0.123** 0.0929*** 0.137** 0.0998***
(0.0483) (0 .0310) (0 .0489) (0 .0298) (0 .0503) (0 .0310)
Employed Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference
Unemployed 0.144* 0.167** 0.130* 0.163** 0.110 0.157**
(0.0733) (0 .0615) (0 .0720) (0 .0617) (0 .0746) (0 .0614)
In education 0.174 0.195** 0.180* 0.200** 0.198* 0.208**
(0.106) (0 .0906) (0 .103) (0 .0891) (0 .100) (0 .0880)
D isab led 0.248* 0.304*** 0.235 0.285*** 0.223 0.283***
(0.136) (0 .0961) (0 .139) (0 .0994) (0 .134) (0 .0946)
Retired 0.0748 0.164*** 0.0547 0.156*** 0.0465 0.152***
(0.0671) (0 .0460) (0 .0678) (0 .0460) (0 .0687) (0 .0460)
O ther 0.0968 0.0823 0.0845 0.0811 0.0738 0.0806
(0.106) (0 .0583) (0 .104) (0 .0582) (0 .101) (0 .0578)
Country xed e¤ets Yes Yes Yes
Constant 4.545*** 4.422*** 4.489*** 4.418*** 4.527*** 4.861***
(0.275) (0 .166) (0 .290) (0 .171) (0 .269) (0 .189)
Observations 30605 30605 30505 30505 30570 30570
R -squared 0.037 0.094 0.032 0.091 0.029 0.091
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses
Table 1: Relationship between the support for the welfare state and di¤erent measures of
trust. Individual observations from ESS round 4.
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Dep endent variab le: support for the welfare state
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Many p eople manage to obtain b enets 0.269*** 0.203***
and serv ices to which they are not entitled (0.0483) (0 .0268)
Most unemployed p eople do not really try 0.285*** 0.231***
to nd a job (0.0425) (0 .0373)
Employees often pretend they are sick in 0.197*** 0.178***
order to stay at home (0.0427) (0 .0266)
Age 0.0126*** 0.0106*** 0.0119*** 0.00985*** 0.0124*** 0.00979***
(0.00284) (0 .00154) (0 .00247) (0 .00132) (0 .00284) (0 .00161)
Male -0 .0441 -0 .0510 -0 .0486 -0 .0502 -0 .0346 -0 .0365
(0.0416) (0 .0382) (0 .0426) (0 .0376) (0 .0417) (0 .0371)
Education 0.0102 0.0156** 0.00823 0.0117* 0.0105 0.0147*
(0.0114) (0 .00723) (0 .00969) (0 .00667) (0 .0113) (0 .00742)
Incom e 0.00201 0.00417 0.00328 0.00436 0.00494 0.00376
(0.0123) (0 .00932) (0 .0110) (0 .00979) (0 .0127) (0 .00884)
Relig iosity 0.00558 0.0159** 0.00606 0.0170*** 0.00780 0.0191***
(0.0153) (0 .00624) (0 .0155) (0 .00581) (0 .0154) (0 .00601)
Politica l orientation -0.103*** -0 .112*** -0 .0929*** -0 .104*** -0 .103*** -0 .112***
(0.0250) (0 .0278) (0.0244) (0 .0268) (0 .0254) (0 .0279)
Married Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference
Separated / D ivorced -0 .0105 -0 .0382 -0 .00567 -0 .0362 0.00915 -0 .0254
(0.0613) (0 .0484) (0.0573) (0 .0478) (0 .0625) (0 .0500)
W idowed -0.150** -0 .0941** -0 .149** -0 .0981** -0 .159** -0 .0984**
(0.0617) (0 .0411) (0.0651) (0 .0430) (0 .0698) (0 .0448)
Never married 0.153** 0.108*** 0.147*** 0.102*** 0.164*** 0.108***
(0.0559) (0 .0332) (0.0518) (0 .0320) (0 .0570) (0 .0323)
Employed Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference
Unemployed 0.0805 0.129** 0.00649 0.0838 0.0708 0.134**
(0.0747) (0 .0598) (0.0853) (0 .0553) (0 .0794) (0 .0633)
In education 0.189* 0.195** 0.198* 0.193** 0.210** 0.205**
(0.103) (0 .0895) (0 .0977) (0 .0889) (0 .0974) (0 .0860)
D isab led 0.175 0.247** 0.225* 0.274*** 0.197 0.241**
(0.135) (0 .0917) (0.129) (0 .0926) (0 .136) (0 .0970)
Retired 0.0561 0.160*** 0.0804 0.175*** 0.0587 0.173***
(0.0702) (0 .0447) (0.0649) (0 .0452) (0 .0665) (0 .0419)
O ther 0.0809 0.0734 0.0571 0.0708 0.0769 0.0861
(0.106) (0 .0595) (0 .0975) (0 .0559) (0 .0993) (0 .0537)
Country xed e¤ets Yes Yes Yes
Constant 4.236*** 4.095*** 4.031*** 3.997*** 4.269*** 4.431***
(0.276) (0 .171) (0.249) (0 .161) (0 .260) (0 .162)
Observations 29795 29795 30394 30394 29882 29882
R -squared 0.037 0.097 0.043 0.102 0.032 0.097
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses
Table 2: Relationship between the support for the welfare state and perceived civicness.
Individual observations from ESS round 4.
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Dependent variab le: support for the welfare state
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Trust in the parliam ent 0.113*** 0.0709***
(0.0189) (0 .0106)
Trust in the legal system 0.112*** 0.0674***
(0.0190) (0 .00867)
Trust in p olitic ians 0.111*** 0.0711***
(0.0217) (0 .0120)
Age 0.0123*** 0.0105*** 0.0128*** 0.0111*** 0.0119*** 0.0105***
(0.00236) (0 .00143) (0 .00228) (0 .00140) (0 .00259) (0 .00144)
Male -0 .0744* -0 .0566 -0 .0649 -0 .0531 -0 .0505 -0 .0467
(0.0429) (0 .0382) (0 .0436) (0 .0386) (0 .0418) (0 .0381)
Education 0.0130 0.0150** 0.0123 0.0168** 0.0129 0.0175**
(0.00910) (0 .00678) (0 .00909) (0 .00681) (0 .0106) (0 .00705)
Incom e -0.00562 0.00247 -0 .00326 0.00234 -0 .00333 0.00441
(0.0124) (0 .00997) (0 .0121) (0 .00956) (0 .0123) (0 .00971)
Relig iosity -0 .00485 0.0121* -0 .00137 0.0127* -0 .00264 0.0116*
(0.0147) (0 .00638) (0 .0145) (0 .00637) (0 .0151) (0 .00640)
Politica l orientation -0 .112*** -0 .121*** -0 .113*** -0 .120*** -0 .113*** -0 .122***
(0.0266) (0 .0285) (0 .0265) (0 .0284) (0 .0272) (0 .0291)
Married Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference
Separated / D ivorced 0.00584 -0 .0254 -0 .00899 -0 .0347 0.00508 -0 .0178
(0.0612) (0 .0517) (0 .0586) (0 .0492) (0 .0612) (0 .0512)
W idowed -0.134* -0 .104** -0 .130* -0 .101** -0 .148** -0 .105**
(0.0667) (0 .0438) (0 .0641) (0 .0449) (0 .0647) (0 .0441)
Never married 0.120** 0.0947*** 0.132** 0.104*** 0.117** 0.0955***
(0.0506) (0 .0328) (0 .0491) (0 .0305) (0 .0516) (0 .0309)
Employed Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference
Unemployed 0.117* 0.161** 0.135* 0.180*** 0.122* 0.156**
(0.0661) (0 .0633) (0 .0695) (0 .0606) (0 .0663) (0 .0631)
In education 0.159 0.181* 0.175* 0.199** 0.162 0.181*
(0.100) (0 .0879) (0 .101) (0 .0893) (0 .105) (0 .0895)
D isab led 0.240* 0.285*** 0.243* 0.290*** 0.227 0.289***
(0.137) (0 .0943) (0 .131) (0 .0931) (0 .142) (0 .0957)
Retired 0.0539 0.148*** 0.0743 0.156*** 0.0443 0.144***
(0.0709) (0 .0456) (0 .0637) (0 .0434) (0 .0683) (0 .0446)
O ther 0.0370 0.0823 0.0670 0.0977 0.0658 0.0825
(0.0903) (0 .0605) (0 .0893) (0 .0597) (0 .107) (0 .0610)
Country xed e¤ets Yes Yes Yes
Constant 4.503*** 4.974*** 4.385*** 4.404*** 4.618*** 4.960***
(0.219) (0 .194) (0 .222) (0 .166) (0 .237) (0 .194)
Observations 30351 30351 30265 30265 30420 30420
R -squared 0.040 0.095 0.042 0.095 0.037 0.094
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses
Table 3: Relationship between the support for welfare state and trust in institutions.
Individual observations from ESS round 4.
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Dependent variab le: support for the welfare state
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
E¢ ciency tax system 0.101*** 0.0748***
(0.0189) (0 .0129)
Advantages tax system 0.107*** 0.0701***
(0.0170) (0 .0102)
E¢ ciency health care 0.118*** 0.0831***
(0.0220) (0 .0112)
Age 0.0132*** 0.0108*** 0.0123*** 0.0109*** 0.0125*** 0.0107***
(0.00275) (0 .00161) (0 .00258) (0 .00160) (0 .00256) (0 .00146)
Male -0 .0474 -0 .0491 -0 .0465 -0 .0483 -0 .0717* -0 .0638*
(0.0439) (0 .0388) (0 .0448) (0 .0385) (0 .0406) (0 .0371)
Education 0.0151 0.0185** 0.0115 0.0174** 0.0176* 0.0196***
(0.0106) (0 .00732) (0 .0101) (0 .00716) (0 .0101) (0 .00695)
Incom e 0.00748 0.00709 -0 .000963 0.00355 0.00227 0.00728
(0.0115) (0 .00922) (0 .0114) (0 .01000) (0 .0122) (0 .00904)
Relig iosity 0.000602 0.0123* 0.00383 0.0130* -0 .000593 0.0108*
(0.0152) (0 .00705) (0 .0147) (0 .00678) (0 .0146) (0 .00619)
Politica l orientation -0 .115*** -0 .122*** -0 .120*** -0 .124*** -0 .110*** -0 .119***
(0.0259) (0 .0285) (0 .0272) (0 .0292) (0 .0253) (0 .0279)
Married Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference
Separated / D ivorced -0 .00841 -0 .0400 -0 .0386 -0 .0577 -0 .0200 -0 .0396
(0.0650) (0 .0516) (0 .0624) (0 .0475) (0 .0625) (0 .0493)
W idowed -0.159** -0 .118*** -0 .181** -0 .141*** -0 .132* -0 .107**
(0.0618) (0 .0387) (0 .0648) (0 .0413) (0 .0680) (0 .0445)
Never married 0.150** 0.0915*** 0.135** 0.0982*** 0.126** 0.0946***
(0.0541) (0 .0303) (0 .0530) (0 .0326) (0 .0501) (0 .0312)
Employed Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference
Unemployed 0.0662 0.131* 0.0844 0.132** 0.104 0.163**
(0.0763) (0 .0638) (0 .0699) (0 .0603) (0 .0708) (0 .0595)
In education 0.205** 0.217** 0.163* 0.189** 0.171* 0.176**
(0.0895) (0 .0781) (0 .0937) (0 .0813) (0 .0829) (0 .0698)
D isab led 0.199 0.262** 0.139 0.211** 0.190 0.279**
(0.136) (0 .0963) (0 .128) (0 .0950) (0 .134) (0 .0995)
Retired 0.0321 0.145*** 0.0451 0.138*** 0.0373 0.143***
(0.0706) (0 .0416) (0 .0666) (0 .0424) (0 .0729) (0 .0465)
O ther 0.0781 0.0900 0.0690 0.0898 0.0556 0.0820
(0.102) (0 .0609) (0 .101) (0 .0581) (0 .0995) (0 .0592)
Country xed e¤ets Yes Yes Yes
Constant 4.322*** 4.788*** 4.456*** 4.375*** 4.230*** 4.826***
(0.232) (0 .200) (0 .238) (0 .187) (0 .240) (0 .186)
Observations 29108 29108 29077 29077 30396 30396
R -squared 0.035 0.095 0.043 0.097 0.039 0.095
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses
Table 4: Relationship between the support for the welfare state and the perceived e¢ -
ciency of the welfare state. Individual observations from ESS round 4.
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Dependent variab le : support for the welfa ire state
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Trust 0 .166***
(0.0311)
C iv ism (b enets) -0 .162***
(0.0436)
C iv ism (transp ort) -0 .149***
(0.0404)
C iv ism (taxes) -0 .0722*
(0.0398)
C iv ism (brib e) -0 .0821**
(0.0364)
C iv ism (litter) -0 .292***
(0.0764)
C iv ism (sto len goods) -0 .188***
(0.0489)
Age 0.000248 0.000891 0.00104 0.000715 0.000663 0.00247 -0 .00110
(0.00126) (0 .00124) (0 .00122) (0 .00122) (0 .00125) (0 .00280) (0 .00193)
Male -0 .0869*** -0 .101*** -0 .0994*** -0 .0976*** -0 .0974*** -0 .205*** -0 .0972**
(0.0235) (0 .0244) (0 .0241) (0 .0230) (0 .0234) (0 .0507) (0 .0398)
Education -0 .107*** -0 .108*** -0 .105*** -0 .106*** -0 .106*** -0 .136*** -0 .133***
(0.0107) (0 .0103) (0 .00994) (0 .0103) (0 .0103) (0 .0214) (0 .0136)
Incom e -0.0942*** -0 .0901*** -0 .0950*** -0 .0918*** -0 .0918*** -0 .0860*** -0 .0992***
(0.0118) (0 .0118) (0 .0106) (0 .0116) (0 .0118) (0 .0126) (0 .0178)
Relig iosity 0.00137 0.00269 0.00187 0.00312 0.00328 0.0348** 0.0109
(0.00591) (0 .00648) (0 .00664) (0 .00641) (0 .00631) (0 .0134) (0 .00874)
Politica l orientation -0 .137*** -0 .138*** -0 .138*** -0 .137*** -0 .138*** -0 .174*** -0 .150***
(0.0125) (0 .0134) (0 .0136) (0 .0132) (0 .0132) (0 .0220) (0 .0197)
Married Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference
Separated / D ivorced -0 .000109 0.000160 -0 .00894 0.00299 0.000150 -0 .0947 -0 .0208
(0.0459) (0 .0463) (0 .0465) (0 .0465) (0 .0473) (0 .108) (0 .0902)
W idowed 0.0568 0.0573 0.0448 0.0571 0.0614 -0 .0256 0.104
(0.0425) (0 .0431) (0 .0442) (0 .0431) (0 .0434) (0 .0850) (0 .0731)
Never married 0.0112 0.00663 0.0131 0.0211 0.0217 -0 .00287 -0 .0683
(0.0295) (0 .0279) (0 .0312) (0 .0292) (0 .0290) (0 .0702) (0 .0578)
Employed Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference
Unemployed 0.145*** 0.139*** 0.137*** 0.136*** 0.138*** 0.0866 0.160**
(0.0339) (0 .0339) (0 .0358) (0 .0341) (0 .0342) (0 .0605) (0 .0769)
In education 0.0656 0.0535 0.0524 0.0502 0.0442 -0 .135 0.0653
(0.0598) (0 .0601) (0 .0639) (0 .0614) (0 .0606) (0 .0947) (0 .103)
Retired 0.129** 0.130** 0.114** 0.128** 0.130** 0.180 0.199***
(0.0518) (0 .0524) (0 .0505) (0 .0526) (0 .0520) (0 .107) (0 .0659)
O ther 0.0457 0.0655* 0.0656* 0.0708** 0.0697** 0.000208 0.0318
(0.0461) (0 .0359) (0 .0359) (0 .0346) (0 .0348) (0 .0601) (0 .0644)
Constant 8.497*** 8.563*** 8.474*** 7.451*** 7.479*** 9.568*** 5.323***
(0.277) (0 .277) (0 .268) (0 .122) (0 .123) (0 .217) (0 .220)
Observations 144291 138965 133242 141945 142192 22538 47757
R -squared 0.113 0.111 0.109 0.110 0.110 0.154 0.105
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses
A ll regressions include tim e and country xed e¤ects
Table 5: Relationship between the support for the welfare state and civism, measured
using di¤erent propensities that some behaviors are unjustiable. Individual observations
from the WVS.
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Dependent variab le : Standard of liv ing of p ensioners Standard of liv ing of unemployed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Most p eop le can b e trusted 0.608*** 0.642***
(0.157) (0 .122)
Corruption p erception index 0.401*** 0.425***
(0.0935) (0 .0682)
Trust in the legal system 0.402** 0.292
(0.157) (0 .176)
Fairness of tax authorities 0 .414** 0.459***
(0.177) (0 .145)
Total so cia l exp enditure -0 .00612 -0 .0441 0.0430 0.0361 -0 .0129 -0 .0532 0.0470 0.0306
(0.0517) (0 .0563) (0 .0538) (0 .0512) (0 .0354) (0 .0313) (0 .0542) (0 .0454)
Observations 24314 24314 24314 24314 24133 24133 24133 24133
R -squared 0.121 0.137 0.083 0.087 0.154 0.177 0.078 0.112
Dep endent variab le : State of education State of health serv ices
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Most p eop le can b e trusted 0.807*** 0.512**
(0.166) (0 .213)
Corruption p erception index 0.352** 0.412***
(0.125) (0 .101)
Trust in the legal system 0.463* 0.338
(0.231) (0 .212)
Fairness of tax authorities 0 .694*** 0.563***
(0.169) (0 .167)
Total so cia l exp enditure -0 .0497 -0 .0503 0.0203 -0 .00320 -0 .00976 -0 .0621 0.0318 0.0104
(0.0476) (0 .0543) (0 .0639) (0 .0532) (0 .0593) (0 .0571) (0 .0530) (0 .0459)
Observations 23754 23754 23754 23754 24385 24385 24385 24385
R -squared 0.135 0.083 0.062 0.114 0.066 0.101 0.044 0.081
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses
A ll regression include age, gender, education , incom e, relig iosity, p olitica l orientation , m arita l status and employm ent status
Table 6: Relationship between the average perceived transparency of the state and its
e¢ ciency. Individual observations from ESS round 4.
Dependent variab le: support for the welfare state
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Generation F irst Second F irst Second F irst Second
Most p eop le can b e trusted 0.282** 0.398***
in residence contry (0.126) (0 .108)
Most p eop le try to b e fa ir 0 .0930 0.192*
in residence contry (0.105) (0 .102)
Most p eop le try to b e help fu l 0 .0579 0.287**
in residence contry (0.0812) (0 .131)
Demand for red istribution 0.302** 0.0855 0.343** 0.266 0.354*** 0.248
in orig in country (0.131) (0 .197) (0 .136) (0 .190) (0 .124) (0 .198)
Observations 1476 1292 1476 1292 1476 1292
R -squared 0.029 0.055 0.018 0.035 0.017 0.040
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses
Regressions include age, gender, m arita l status, employm ent status, incom e and a constant term .
Table 7: Relationship between the demand for redistribution and di¤erent measures of
trust, controlling for the demand for redistribution in origin country. First and second
generation immigrants.
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Dependent variab le: support for the welfare state
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Generation F irst Second F irst Second F irst Second
Trust in the legal system 0.140 0.381***
in residence contry (0.101) (0 .133)
Trust in p olitic ians 0.157 0.292**
in residence contry (0.136) (0 .131)
Trust in the parliam ent 0.186 0.294***
in residence contry (0.114) (0 .0880)
Demand for red istribution 0.353** 0.102 0.350** 0.151 0.358*** 0.145
in orig in country (0.133) (0 .221) (0 .128) (0 .175) (0 .120) (0 .178)
Observations 1476 1292 1476 1292 1476 1292
R -squared 0.022 0.056 0.023 0.047 0.027 0.051
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses
Regressions include age, gender, m arita l status, employm ent status, incom e and a constant term .
Table 8: Relationship between the demand for redistribution and di¤erent measures of
trust in institutions, controlling for the demand for redistribution in origin country. First
and second generation immigrants.
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Dependent variab le: support for the welfare state
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
F irst Second F irst Second F irst Second
Demand for red istribution 0.754*** 0.104 0.698*** 0.0924
in orig in country (0.192) (0 .222) (0 .196) (0 .290)
Real GDP per cap ita l 0 .175 0.772** 0.0813 0.717**
in orig in country (0.222) (0 .325) (0 .212) (0 .330)
Total so cia l exp enditure 0.00629 -0 .0629 0.0157 -0 .0409
in orig in country (0.0169) (0 .0435) (0 .0152) (0 .0496)
Demand for red istribution 0.822** 0.521** 0.772** 0.613**
in residence country (0.335) (0 .240) (0 .317) (0 .216)
Real GDP per cap ita l -0 .911 0.303 -0 .695 0.784*
in residence country (0.536) (0 .334) (0 .552) (0 .411)
Total so cia l exp enditure -0 .0109 -0 .0183 0.00399 -0 .0552**
in residence country (0.0167) (0 .0216) (0 .0202) (0 .0242)
Residence country xed e¤ects Yes Yes
O rig in country xed e¤ects Yes Yes
Observations 649 722 649 722 649 722
R -squared 0.085 0.071 0.104 0.085 0.102 0.081
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses
Regressions include age, gender, m arita l status, employm ent status, incom e and a constant term .
Table 9: Relationship between the individual support for the welfare state and the support
for the welfare state in the country of origin and in the country of residence. First and
second generation immigrants.
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Dependent variab le: support for the welfare state (v ia incom e equality)
(1) (2)
Trust 0 .302*** 0.180***
(0.0824) (0 .0318)
Luck -0 .00535 -0 .00828
(0.0162) (0 .0122)
Country xed e¤ects Yes
Observations 89602 89602
R -squared 0.046 0.110
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses
Regressions include age, gender, m arita l status, employm ent status,
education , incom e, relig iosity, p olitica l orientation , year of interv iew
xed e¤ects and a constant term .
Table 10: Relationship between the demand for redistribution and trust. Robustness
check using the perception of success. Individual observations from the WVS.
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Dependent variab le : support for the welfa ire state (v ia incom e equality)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Luck -0 .0101 -0 .00507 -0 .00791 -0 .00722 -0 .0181 -0 .0151
(0.0126) (0 .0129) (0 .0127) (0 .0127) (0 .0221) (0 .0124)
C iv ism (b enets) -0 .166***
(0.0524)
C iv ism (transp ort) -0 .126***
(0.0474)
C iv ism (taxes) -0 .0739
(0.0531)
C iv ism (brib e) -0 .0624
(0.0417)
C iv ism (litter) -0 .415
(0.179)
C iv ism (sto len goods) -0 .207***
(0.0496)
Observations 87720 86528 89187 89319 3907 44638
R -squared 0.110 0.113 0.109 0.109 0.079 0.111
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses
Regressions include age, gender, m arita l status, employm ent status, education , incom e, relig iosity,
p olitica l orientation , year of interv iew xed e¤ects, country xed e¤ects and a constant term .
Table 11: Relationship between the demand for redistribution and trust. Robustness
check using the perception of succes. Individual observations from the WVS.
Dependent variab le: support for the welfare state
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Most p eop le can b e trusted 0.0740*** 0.0719***
(0.0132) (0 .0125)
Most p eop le try to b e fa ir 0 .0492*** 0.0514***
(0.0130) (0 .0129)
Most p eop le try to b e help fu l 0 .0477*** 0.0487***
(0.0133) (0 .0129)
Resp ondent education interacted w ith fathers education Yes Yes Yes
Resp ondent education interacted w ith mothers education Yes Yes Yes
Observations 28776 29438 28694 29343 28750 29409
R -squared 0.095 0.095 0.092 0.092 0.091 0.092
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses
Regressions include age, gender, m arita l status, employm ent status, incom e, relig iosity,
p olitica l orientation , country xed e¤ects and a constant term .
Table 12: Relationship between the demand for redistribution and di¤erent measures of
trust. Robustness check with the education of parents. Individual observations from ESS
round 4.
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Appendix
Dependent variab le : trust
Norway Reference Age 0.00175***
(0.000409)
Austra lia -0 .193*** Male -0 .00987*
(0.0403) (0 .00590)
Austria -0 .247*** Education 0.0323***
(0.0239) (0 .00338)
Belg ium -0.281*** Incom e 0.0105***
(0.0187) (0 .00228)
Canada -0.229*** Relig iosity 0.00870***
(0.0313) (0 .00175)
Czech Republic -0 .304*** Politica l orientation -0 .00782***
(0.0165) (0 .00270)
Denmark -0 .00268 Married Reference
(0 .0501)
F in land -0.0757** Separated / D ivorced -0 .0178**
(0.0352) (0 .00783)
France -0 .301*** W idowed -0.0149
(0.0150) (0 .0126)
Germany -0.239*** Never married 0.00476
(0.0279) (0 .00857)
G reece -0 .314*** Employed Reference
(0 .0104)
Hungary -0 .295*** Unemployed -0 .0593***
(0.0140) (0 .0129)
Ireland -0.243*** In education 0.0366*
(0.0236) (0 .0189)
Ita ly -0 .261*** Retired -0 .0518***
(0.0242) (0 .00777)
Japan -0.228*** O ther -0 .0279***
(0.0339) (0 .0108)
South Korea -0 .305***
(0.0152) Observations 58873
Luxembourg -0 .283*** Pseudo R -squared 0.113
(0.0164)
M exico -0 .289***
(0.0132)
Netherlands -0 .141***
(0.0382)
New Zealand -0.240***
(0.0328)
Poland -0.309***
(0.0137)
S lovakia -0 .327***
(0.0108)
Spain -0 .240***
(0.0284)
Sweden -0.0619*
(0.0317)
Sw itzerland -0.146***
(0.0356)
Turkey -0 .378***
(0.0186)
United K ingdom -0.269***
(0.0203)
United States -0 .260***
(0.0259)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses
T im e xed e¤ects are included
Marginal e¤ects from the estim ation of a prob it model
Table 13: Determinants of trust in others. Individual observations from WVS.
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Dependent variab le : condence in institutions
Norway Reference Age 0.000589
(0.000377)
Austra lia -0 .307** Male -0 .00733
(0.133) (0 .0176)
Austria -0 .263* Education 0.0120
(0.143) (0 .00913)
Belg ium -0.516*** Incom e 0.0107***
(0.144) (0 .00368)
Canada -0.205 Relig iosity 0.0353***
(0.142) (0 .00360)
Czech Republic -0 .806*** Politica l orientation 0.0175**
(0.139) (0 .00819)
Denmark -0 .0747 Married Reference
(0 .141)
F in land -0.0650 Separated / D ivorced -0 .0705***
(0.0760) (0 .0153)
France -0 .420*** W idowed 0.0153
(0.136) (0 .0220)
Germany -0.446*** Never married -0 .0225*
(0.136) (0 .0131)
G reece -0 .934*** Employed Reference
(0 .148)
Hungary -0 .463*** Unemployed -0 .0649**
(0.139) (0 .0256)
Ireland -0.372** In education 0.0724***
(0.146) (0 .0205)
Ita ly -0 .555*** Retired 0.0322**
(0.137) (0 .0144)
Japan -0.326** O ther 0.0621
(0.155) (0 .0486)
South Korea -0 .241*** Constant -0 .108
(0.0811) (0 .0838)
Luxembourg -0 .128
(0.143) Observations 47666
M exico -0 .597*** R -squared 0.104
(0.0631)
Netherlands -0 .385**
(0.139)
New Zealand -0.692***
(0.148)
Poland -0.683***
(0.133)
S lovakia -0 .595***
(0.144)
Spain -0 .315***
(0.0968)
Sweden -0.0495
(0.0716)
Sw itzerland -0.150***
(0.0393)
Turkey -0 .139***
(0.0323)
United K ingdom -0.312**
(0.140)
United States -0 .396***
(0.130)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses
T im e xed e¤ects are included
Table 14: Determinants of condence in institutions. Individual observations from WVS.
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Figure 13: Distribution of answers to civicness related questions. Source: World Values
Survey.
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